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Abstract
Substation cyber assets are mission critical for
protection and control of substations. Managing and
ensuring their secure operation is of paramount
importance. A known vulnerability is hidden failures
which are responsible for about 10% of misoperations and their detrimental effects on system
reliability. The paper presents an integrated
centralized substation protection approach that is
based on the recently developed setting-less relays
which are integrated into a centralized substation
protection scheme with the following features: (a)
fast, dependable and secure protection of each
substation protection zone by a settingless relay, (b)
supervision of each settingless relay by validating
relay input data by a substation wide state estimator,
(c) self-healing against hidden failures by detecting
and identifying compromised data and replacing
them with estimated values, thus ensuring that the
settingless relays will always operate on validated
data. The paper provides a summary review of the
settingless protective relay and introduces the
Integrated Centralized Substation Protection Scheme
(ICSP) which uses the data from all settingless relays
in the substation to perform a substation wide state
estimation. The state estimator uses a hypothesis
testing algorithm to determine whether (a) data are
valid with no faults or hidden failures, (b) data are
valid and a fault exists in the system, or (c) some data
are invalid due to hidden failures. In the last case, the
state estimator uses the substation state and model to
replace the compromised data with estimated values
and thus enabling self-immunization against hidden
failures. A byproduct of the method is the substation
state estimate which is transmitted to the control
center where it is used with the state from all
substations to synthesize the system wide state
estimate and model. Architectural issues are
addressed as well as migration issues of existing
systems into the proposed ICSP.
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1. Introduction
The technological advancements in communications
and computational capabilities have paved the way for
new approaches in power system protection and
control. New approaches are necessary to confront the
challenges introduced by the new, revolutionary
changes in power systems. These challenges are
concurrent with tremendous efforts by utilities to
boost system reliability. Such efforts are undermined
by mis-operations of the protection system. The rate
of relay mis-operation, as a percentage of total
operations is approximately 10 percent, as reported by
North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) [1]. An analysis of protection failures reveals
that the majority occurs because of hidden failures.
Such failures are defined in [2] as “permanent
defect[s] that will cause a relay or a relay system to
incorrectly and inappropriately remove a circuit
element(s) as a direct consequence of another
switching event.”
Present numerical relays have a limited capability to
detect hidden failures. Presently, relays are not
capable to correct the effects of the hidden failures nor
they have the capability to detect the true condition of
the power system in the presence of hidden failures.
As a result, when a hidden failure is detected the only
option is to inhibit the protection function. The
affected protection system depends on other protection
systems, unaffected by the hidden failure(s), to take
the proper action. It should be apparent the protection
system reliability is decreased.
Relay manufacturers and researchers have proposed
approaches that could minimize the effects of hidden
failures and cope with other complexities. Along these
lines, adaptive protection schemes and voting schemes
have been proposed. Adaptive protection schemes
have been proven to be complex and do not easily
meet the speed that is required for protection. Voting
schemes are not reliable as a hidden failure may affect
several relays that participate in the voting – in this
case the majority of relays may be taking a wrong
decision.
In response to these challenges, several new concepts
have emerged. The idea of setting-less protection was
inspired by the differential protection function, which
is simple, features minimal settings, and most

Page 2652

importantly, does not require coordination with other
protective relay functions [3], [4]. The setting-less
protection relay monitors all physical laws that the
device under protection must satisfy when it operates
normally (i.e. unfaulted). This monitoring is
accomplished by performing dynamic state
estimation (DSE) using sampled value measurements.
DSE continuously compares the collected
measurements (i.e., sampled values) to the dynamic
model of the protection zone and provides a
quantitative assessment of how well the data fit the
dynamic model. Specifically, the chi-square test
calculates the probability that the measurements fit
the model. The chi-square test typically returns a
probability of 100% for healthy protection zones and
0% for protection zones with any type of fault.
Setting-less relays, as any other type of relay, are
vulnerable to hidden failures which corrupt the
measured values. Hence, a mechanism to detect such
failures is essential for reliable protection of power
systems.
The objective of this paper is to incorporate settingless relays into an integrated centralized substation
protection scheme (i.e., Integrated Centralized
Substation Protection (ICSP)). The ICSP supervises
the validity of the measured values streaming into the
setting-less relays by performing a substation-wide
state estimation, using data from all setting-less relays
in the substation. In case that compromised data are
detected, the ICSP has the capability to replace the
compromised data with corrected data using the state
estimates and the real time model. The paper details
the computational procedures of the ICSP as well as
the proposed system architecture. Section II presents
the ICSP in as much detail as practical, given paper
length restrictions. Section III discusses the
architecture of the ICSP. Finally, Section IV provides
an illustrative example. Section V provides
concluding remarks and section VI discusses the
usefulness of the proposed ICSP in providing the
basic infrastructure for the energy management
system of the future.

monitor the integrity of the overall system. In our
implementation, at the setting-less relays, the
dynamic state estimation is performed 40 times per
cycle using sampled values obtained with the
merging units. This accommodates the standard
sampling rate of 80 samples per cycle. This process
has been demonstrated with extensive numerical
experiments, in the laboratory and in the field.
The setting-less relay can also compute the phasors of
the V and I measurements and stream the phasor data
to the station bus as indicated in Figures 1 and 2. The
phasor measurements are used to perform a
substation-wide state estimator. All the measurements
from all relays represent a high data redundancy for
the substation wide state estimator. We performed an
analysis of actual substations and the redundancy is
above 2000% meaning that the number of
measurements from all relays is typically 20 times the
number of state variables describing the substation
state. The substation-wide state estimator is
implemented with three additional important
applications: (a) detection of bad data, (b) hypothesis
testing,
and
(c)
correction/replacement
of
compromised data, if any. The large redundancy
makes these applications robust and provides the
mechanism by which the individual setting-less relays
are supervised and ensure that they will always
operate with validated data. A concise description of
these functions is provided next.

Figure 1: Illustration of Overall Approach

2. Integrated Centralized Substation
Protection
We present an approach for reliable monitoring of the
overall protection system. We prefer an
implementation using merging units and setting-less
relays for protection zones. The overall proposed
structure is shown in Figure 1. The system consists of
the instrumentation, the merging units, the settingless relays that provide protection for each protection
zone, communications channels between relays and
controls and telemetering and a substation wide
quasi-dynamic state estimation to continuously

Substation-Wide Dynamic State Estimation Module
The substation-wide dynamic state estimation module
operates on the entire measurement set of the
substation. No other information is needed. The DSE
computes the best estimate of the substation dynamic
state. Subsequently, the goodness of fit between the
measurements and the substation model is computed
via the well-known chi-square test which calculates
the probability of goodness of fit between the
measurement and the substation model. This
probability is also referred to as confidence level. A
high probability of goodness of fit, i.e. more than
0.90 results in declaring all the data in the substation
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valid. In this case no further action is required.
Otherwise, the hypothesis module is called to identify
the root cause of the bad data via hypothesis testing
and correct/replace compromised data.
Hypothesis Testing Module. This module is initiated
when the dynamic state estimation has declared the
existence of bad data (data abnormality). The
objective of this module is to identify the root cause
of the abnormality, i.e. power fault or hidden failure
or both. There exist three possibilities: (a) one or
more power faults exist in the system, (b) one or
more hidden failures, or (c) simultaneous occurrence
of faults and hidden failures. The probability of
having two simultaneous faults or two simultaneous
hidden failures within the substation is very low.
Realistically, we consider the following possible
events as most likely to occur: (a) occurrence of a
hidden failure, (b) occurrence of a power fault, and
(c) simultaneous occurrence of a power fault and a
hidden failure. Other possible events will have
insignificant
probabilities
of
occurring
simultaneously.
The hypothesis testing is guided by the following
observations: (a) at the substation level the
redundancy is high (over 2000%) – this implies that
the existence of leveraging points are not existent and
therefore normalized residuals from the state
estimator can be used as guidance of where the
problem is located. (b) System is continuously
running – this implies that any abnormal event will be
captured in real time. The probability of simultaneous
failure events occurring at exactly the same time is
low. Thus the hypotheses to be considered should be
limited to first order events.
The mechanics of hypothesis testing are as follows:
First, suspect measurements are identified from
normalized residuals which are provided by the DSE.
Second, suspect measurements are grouped using the
source of the data (merging units) and also by
protection zone. Third, protection zones are identified
for which the protection functions have reported a
fault. Subsequently, three types of hypothesis testing
are performed as follows:
Hypothesis Type 1 (H1): Remove suspect
measurements and rerun DSE. If probability is high
(more than 0.9), then: (a) removed measurements are
bad, (b) identify root cause, (c) issue diagnostics, and
(d) replace bad data with estimated values. End
hypothesis testing. Otherwise go to H2.
Hypothesis Type 2 (H2): (determine if a fault
decision is correct). For the reported faulted device,
remove all internal device measurements and remove
the faulted device model from the substation model.
Then rerun DSE. If probability is high (more than

0.9), then: (a) the device/protection zone is truly
experiencing an internal fault. Allow zone settingless relay to trip the faulted device. End hypothesis
testing.
Hypothesis Type 3 (H3): This test combines type 1
and type 2 hypothesis testing to cover the case of a
simultaneous fault and a hidden failure.
Data
Correction
Module.
The
data
correction/replacement module is executed when a
hidden failure of instrumentation channels has been
identified. The hypothesis testing has identified a
number of compromised measurements. Then using
the model of the entire substation and the real time
operating conditions (both provided by the DSE) the
physical
quantities
represented
by
these
measurements are computed (estimated values). The
computed
quantities
are
sampled
values.
Subsequently, the ICSP streams the estimated values
of the compromised data into the process bus,
replacing the actual data collected by the merging
units. Now any computing device, including the
setting-less relays, using the sampled values at the
process bus will be using corrected data.
To complete the picture, the substation-wide state
estimator also communicates with the control center
(EMS). Specifically, the validated results (substation
state estimate) from the state estimator are streamed
to the EMS where the results from all substations can
be time aligned and synthesize the operating
conditions (state) of the entire system. It is
emphasized that the proposed approach facilitates
efficient
communications.
Specifically,
each
substation sends to the EMS only the substation state
which comprises a very small number of data. When
connectivity changes, then connectivity data are
transmitted by exception. Similarly if model changes
occur, the new mathematical model will be
transmitted by exception. The end result is that while
the merging units in a substation may be collecting
data at rates of millions of data points per second
(sampled values), the frequency domain state
(phasors) are only a few tens of data points per cycle
and per substation.
In summary, the ICSP provides a real time system for
supervising the operation of the setting-less relays in
a substation and ensuring that the data streaming into
these relays are validated data. More importantly, in
case of hidden failures, the data compromised by the
hidden failure are replaced with estimated values
form the validated substation model and operating
state to ensure the continuous dependable and secure
operation of the relays. The ICSP provides selfhealing capability for the system in case of hidden
failures. The proposed ICSP represents a new
approach which has become possible with technology
that has been developed only in the past few years.
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3. Communications and Data
Management
Critical to this work is the ability to manage data and
communications between the various devices (i.e.,
setting-less relays and ICSP) within the substation
and also between the substation and the control
center. Therefore, we have defined the details of the
system
architecture,
which
specifies
data
management, communication protocols, and the
hierarchical structure of the system. Figure 2
illustrates the overall proposed architecture with
emphasis on the data flow and data handling. The
lower part of the Figure shows the architecture to deal
with sampled values. Note that all SV are
concentrated on four circular buffers which are
handled with the sample value data concentrator
(SVDC). The four circular buffers handle the local
SVs and the telemetered SV with full redundancy
(one primary for the local SV and one backup as well
as one primary for the telemetered SV and one
backup). The SVDC time aligns the SVs as they may
be coming from the various merging units with
different time latencies and orders them in the
circular buffer. Time synchronization is critical for
reliable operation of both setting-less relays and
centralized protection schemes. The required timing
accuracy for such applications is less than 1 μs.
Accordingly, we propose using the IEEE 1588v2 time
synchronization standard known as the precision time
protocol (PTP) as illustrated in Figure 2. This
protocol operates through a data network and can
achieve time accuracy of less than 1 μs.

time model of the substation to estimate the sampled
values that are affected by the hidden failure and
streams the estimated SV to the process bus replacing
the compromised data. This way the setting-less
relays will be now operating on validated data.
The figure also shows communication links to other
substations and the control center. The availability of
the data on circular buffers facilitates accessibility of
the data from any application.
Control functions, not shown in the figure, are
executed with GOOSE messaging. GOOSE message
exchanges between the IED and ICSP takes place in
the station bus. These GOOSE messages include but
are not limited to breaker status, disconnect status,
setting-less relays operation status, and ICSP
permissive signal to setting-less relays.

4. Illustrative Example
The concept of ICSP has been tested with numerous
numerical
experiments.
Here
we
present
results/numerical experiment on a relatively small
substation which comprises five protection zones, as
shown in Figures 3 and 4 [5]. Specifically, we
consider only the following five Protection Zones of
the substation: (a) 115 kV Transmission Line, (b) 115
kV Bus, (c) 115/13.8 kV, 36 MVA Transformer, (d)
13.8 kV Bus, and (e) 13.8 kV Distribution Line (one
of the two). The objective of the numerical
experiments was to prove the concept and show that
the system can meet the time response requirements of
a protection system so that can be implemented on a
larger scale.

Figure 3: Example Test System for Numerical
Experiments

Figure 2: Overall Architecture of the Proposed Scheme

The upper part of the Figure shows a similar
architecture for phasor data, indicated as station bus.
The station bus facilitates data exchange between
setting-less relays and ICSP. The scheme also
accommodates telemetered phasor data. This includes
phasor quantities streaming from setting-less relays to
ICSP as well as telemetered phasors at a rate of up to
1 sample/cycle. Moreover, upon detecting hidden
failure the ICSP uses the estimated state and the real

We present a simulated a hidden failure scenario of
CT reverse polarity. Typically, this event occurs
following pre-commissioning activities for a new
substation or maintenance activities for an existing
substation. In either case, the problem may remain
hidden following the energization until the effected
zone is loaded. This case simulates the CT reverse
polarity to analyze the response of both the settingless relay and the ICSP. Specifically, we modeled CT10 (see figure 4) phases A, B, and C, which provide
the setting-less relay of the transformer zone with the
current measurements at the transformer secondary,
with reverse polarity by swapping the terminals of
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each CT at the relay terminals. The sequence of events
starts with energizing the substation without load.
Then, the transformer is loaded with a 15 MW load at
time t=3s.

selected parameter; in this case we used the value of 2.
Consequently, the measurements extracted from CT10 are classified as suspicious measurements. The
ICSP initiated hypothesis testing by removing the CT10 measurements. The hypothesis testing was
successful and returned a high confidence level. The
ICSP concluded that there is a hidden failure within
the substation and did not detect any faulty zones.
Additionally, the ICSP precisely identified the
instrumentation channels that have been compromised
by the hidden failure. Subsequently, the ICSP created
a virtual merging unit that computes the phase A, B
and C currents from the estimated substation state and
substation model. The computed estimated sampled
values replace the compromised data from CT-10 and
attached merging unit. At the same time a diagnostic
is issued and transmitted to the control center operator
to alarm him/her of the detected hidden failure and the
need for a repair. This case demonstrates the
advantage of redundancy in the measurements, which
makes the hypothesis testing very efficient.

Figure 5: Setting-less relay of the transformer zone for
the test case

Figure 4: Example Test System: One line diagram with
instrumentation

Figure 5 shows the electric current waveforms of
the secondary side of the transformer (CT-9 and CT10) depicted from the setting-less relay of the
transformer zone. The figure shows a 180 degreephase shift between the current waveforms extracted
from CT 9 (i.e., the healthy CT) and CT 10 because of
the reverse polarity. Figure 5 also depicts the settingless relay operations for this event, which show that
the relay operated and initiated a trip signal to isolate
the transformer. This response is a relay mis-operation
because of the hidden failure.
The ICSP responded to the event of the hidden failure
by fisrt detecting bad data via the hypothesis testing
and then initiating hypothesis testing. The ICSP
computed normalized residuals show high values.
Figure 6 shows the nine highest values of the
normalized residuals. Note that the measurement from
CT-10, phase B, has the highest normalized residual.
The common mode criteria verification revealed that
all three phases measurements extracted from CT-10
exceeded the threshold. The threshold is a user

Figure 6: Highest values of the normalized residuals

The detected faulty waveforms in the setting-less relay
were replaced with the estimated signals computed in
the ICSP and streamed to the setting-less relay, as
shown in Figure 7. Note that there is a period of about
two cycles after t=3s for which the setting-less relay
operates with compromised data from the hidden
failure. During this period the setting-less relay reports
zero confidence level. At time t=3.032s the corrected
data start arriving at the process bus and the settingless relay now operates on validated data. Note on the
figure the reversal of the electric current data and the
almost immediate response of the setting-less relay to
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100% confidence level. This process demonstrates the
speed of the ICSP to self-heal the protection system
within two cycles and enable the correct operation of
the setting-less relay even in the presence of the
hidden failure.

Moreover, we defined the IEC 61850-based
architecture of the ICSP with high degree of
redundancy at every layer. The architecture entails
separating the process bus and the station bus into two
separate local networks. We proposed PRP topology
for the process and station buses to satisfy the
criterion of 0s data recovery. Furthermore, we
introduced data concentrators at both the station and
process buses. The data concentrators aggregate data
from different sources and overcome the challenge of
data latency. The proposed architecture is fully
redundant.

6. Future Energy Management System

Figure 7: Setting-less relay corrected response

5. Conclusions
This paper proposes an Integrated Centralized
Substation Protection (ICSP) scheme, which operates
at the substation level. It has the capability to detect
hidden failures in real time and to take corrective
action. Specifically it has the following attributes:


Supervises protection functions of individual
protection zones



Detects and identifies type and location of
Hidden Failures. In this case computes and
replaces the compromised data and streams the
corrected data into the process bus for secure and
dependable operation of the setting-less relays.



Determines existence of faults and in this case
allows zone protective relays to operate

The process starts with data streaming from the
setting-less relay to the ICSP as well as telemetered
data also streaming into the ICSP. The ICSP processes
the data by performing substation-wide Dynamic State
Estimation. This process verifies the consistency (or
inconsistency) between the measurement and the
substation model. Upon detecting inconsistency
through the chi-square test, the ICSP performs
hypothesis testing to identify the root cause of the
inconsistencies, i.e. hidden failures or faults or both.
We have demonstrated, through numerical
experiments, the scheme’s capability of detecting
hidden failures and to take corrective action in case of
hidden failures.

The proposed ICSP provides an infrastructure that
will be fundamental for the future Energy
Management Systems. Specifically it provides a
distributed dynamic state estimator that makes
available the operating state of the system at speeds
not available today, i.e. once per cycle. In addition
provides all the data collected at a substation at two
different time scales, i.e. sampled values (typically
200 microsecond resolution) and phasor values
(typically 16 ms resolution). This data are provided in
redundant circular buffers and are available to any
other applications.
This infrastructure is necessary for the future Energy
Management Systems. The introduction of new
resources in power systems with faster controls
present new operational challenges which require
faster detection of system conditions and faster
responses. Decision-making in the future grid
requires innovative approaches that overcome the
existing limitations. These approaches include
advanced data management, sophisticated analytics
capabilities, and massive computational capabilities.
Our proposed ICSP and its architecture provide the
required infrastructure at the substation level for the
future energy management system. There is an
enormous amount of measurement data at the
substation platform, which are managed by the ICSP,
the information (substation state and topology)
included in the data is extracted and is streamed to the
control center. This represents a drastic reduction of
data being communicated to the control center
(dramatic reduction in throughput) without losing any
information about the substation and at a speed that
has not been possible with previous technologies. The
availability of the accurate substation models at the
control center, updated with frequency of once per
cycle, provide opportunities for much faster real time
applications. This capability make the control center
more effective in decision-making and insures a
reliable and cost effective operation and control for
the power system network.
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The future EMS will utilize the distributed state
estimator of the ICSP, as a source of substation real
time operating conditions and substation models to
support all required control center applications.
Specifically, each substation sends through the ICSP
to the EMS its real time model and operating
conditions. Any substation topology change,
switching, tap changes, breaker operation, etc. it will
be communicated to the control center with end to
end latency of not exceeding 2 cycles. As a matter of
fact while the operating conditions of the substation
are streamed continuously (up to 60 times per
second), the substation model is communicated by
exception when a changed has occurred. This way the
throughput is drastically reduced. Along with the
operating conditions of the substation the ICSP can
send substation alarms that can be used for increased
awareness of substation conditions and activate any
security measurements to insure reliable operation.
The EMS synthesizes the overall system state from
the states of each substation in real time. This
information can be used in many applications
associated with power system economic operation
and control as shown in Figure 8. The synthesis of the
entire system state from the substation states is
straightforward because each substation state is time
tagged with GPS accuracy. Simply stated, the states
of all substations with the same time tag are
combined to provide the system state at that specific
time tag. Note that it is important that the time tags
are accurate. The ICSP provides an accuracy of one
microsecond which is more than enough to guarantee
a reliable process.
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Figure 8: Future Energy Management System

In summary, the ICSP paves the way for advanced
(next generation) EMS that is capable to perform
several applications with accurate and validated
models in real time and overcome the challenges
posed by the future power grid.
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